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TIME TO TAKE
ACTION
The 2006/07 crime
statistics 
With increases of 2.4% and 4.6% respectively in the murder and aggravated robbery rates, the police’s
release of the 2006/07 crime statistics confirmed the fears of many that violent crime is on the increase.
During the media conference the police communicated the bad news badly in an obvious attempt to
downplay the seriousness of a situation over which they, according to their own admission, actually have very
little control. In a bizarre way this confirms that whatever we are doing to fight crime isn’t working and that it
is time to consider something completely different. 
When the South African Police Service(SAPS) released the latest crimestatistics, they confirmed what many
people expected - that there had been a serious
increase in violent crime. This upward trend was
disappointing, particularly in view of promising
decreases since 2002/03. The news led to
renewed calls in the media for the Minister of
Safety and Security and the National
Commissioner of the SAPS to be ‘fired’ (e.g.in The
Citizen 2007:12). The statistics also gave
ammunition to those who doubt South Africa’s
ability to provide adequate levels of security
during the 2010 Soccer World Cup. But, above
all, the statistics had a negative impact on public
perceptions of crime and, according to a recent
Markinor survey, the police’s ability to protect
civilians and their property (Harris & Radealli
2007). 
The analysis in this article focuses primarily on
murder and aggravated robbery and draws on
international experience to contextualise the
trends revealed in the SAPS statistics. 
The overall crime picture
In South Africa crime and crime statistics remain
highly controversial and contested issues. No
explanation will ever satisfy everyone. In a country
with undeniably high levels of crime, strong public
reaction is understandable and more so after a
particularly bad year such as 2006/07. Even the
‘good’ news, that there is an overall downward
trend, was met with scepticism and suspicion. This
is also not a uniquely South African phenomenon.
In the 2005/06 British Crime Survey (BCS), for
example, it was found that:
[d]espite the total number of crimes
estimated by the BCS falling over recent
years, comparatively high proportions of
people continue to believe that crime has
risen across the country as a whole and in
their local area. (Walkeret al 2006:34) 
Based on South Africa’s crime figures for the
thirteen-year period between 1994/95 and 2006/07
(Figure 1),1 it is evident that South Africa’s worst
levels of crime were experienced in 2002/03. These
figures, incidentally, only refer to crimes that are
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Figure 1: Overall crime in South Africa (21 most serious crimes)
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reported to the police. Yet, ironically, in 2003 South
Africa hosted an incident-free ICC Cricket World
Cup,2 which shows that crime on its own is not a
fair criterion to judge the police’s ability to provide
adequate security for a major event such as the
2010 Soccer World Cup. In 2002/03 a total of 
2 629 137 crimes (in the category of most serious
crimes) were reported to the police, compared to 
2 125 227 in 2006/07. That is a decrease of almost
20%. The graph in Figure 1 shows that the overall
crime rate dropped steadily by approximately 6%
per year between 2002/03 and 2005/06, but in
2006/07 the decrease slowed to only 2%.
Judging from the overall picture, at least as far as
reported crime is concerned, crime is still on the
decrease, albeit at a slower rate than in the three
preceding years. This raises legitimate questions
about why the rate of decrease has slowed. Indeed,
although the crime statistics provided by the SAPS
are generally regarded as fairly accurate and
credible, the question of the extent to which
reported crime is a true reflection of the ‘real’ crime
situation remains relevant. For example, according
to Burton et al (2004:105-108), the 2003 National
Victims of Crime Survey in South Africa showed a
reporting rate of 97% for vehicle theft, but a
reporting rate of only 29% for robbery (Figure 2).
More regular ‘victims of crime’ surveys, such as
those conducted by the Home Office in Britain on
an annual basis, would go some way towards
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providing an indication of what percentage of  crime
is reported to the police.
But it is undoubtedly the violence associated with
crime in South Africa that has had the most negative
impact on perceptions of crime and the vulnerability
expressed by many. Accordingly, the following six
violent crimes and crime tendencies (i.e. murder
and five types of aggravated robbery: house robbery,
business robbery, bank robbery, cash-in-transit
robbery and car-hijackings) will be briefly discussed.
Violent crime trends
Murder and aggravated robbery are the two violent
crimes that, after consecutive years in which the
statistics revealed a steady decrease in the rate of
incidence, again showed an upward curve in the
2006/07 period. According to the police (SAPS
2007:11) much of the increase in robbery in
particular can be linked to the security guard strike
of April – June 2006 ‘… which left a void for
robbers … to commit crime’. In turn, aggravated
robbery would also have an impact on the murder
rate, because murder and attempted murder often
accompany these robberies. 
Murder
In the eleven-year period between 1994/95 and
2005/06, the murder rate decreased by
approximately 41% from 67 per 100 000 to 39.5
(Figure 3). Twice before, in 1995/06 and 1998/99,
public with the security they believe they are
entitled to. For example, in their 2006/07 crime
report the SAPS indicated that a docket analysis
showed that in 81,5% of murder cases the
perpetrators were known to their victims; in 61,9%
of cases perpetrators were either relatives, friends or
acquaintances of victims; and in 20,1% of cases
perpetrators were relatives (SAPS 2007:28).
According to the police, the relatively high number
of contact crimes occur in social environments (e.g.
residences), which are normally outside the reach of
conventional policing (SAPS 2007:4). This means
that there is very little,
if anything, the police
can do to prevent these
particular types of
crime. 
This too is not a
uniquely South African
phenomenon. For
example, a study in
Australia found a clear
relationship in many
homicide cases
between victims and
offenders (Australian
Institute of Criminology
2006:20). The study
found that 38% of male
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the murder rate showed slight increases followed
again by consecutive years of decline. In 2006/07
the rate increased once again to 40.5. It is
impossible to say whether this is just another
periodical increase to be followed by a renewed
downward trend or whether this is indicative of a
new rise in violent crime in this country. 
Claims by the police that most murders and other
‘social contact crimes’ take place between people
who know each other is often met with disbelief
and regarded as an excuse for not providing the
Figure 3: Murder rate        
Figure 2: Reporting of crime to police
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100 000) decreased to 272.2 and 255.3
respectively. Although the rate was still much
higher than the 1996/97 figure, these decreases
were promising and raised expectations that
aggravated robbery was on the decline. However,
in 2006/07 the rate of aggravated robberies
increased again (with 4,6%) to 267.1 per 100 000
or, in real terms, 126 558 incidents.
The real threat or perceived threat of aggravated
robbery is better understood when it is
disaggregated into some of its sub-categories. The
following serve as examples:
• Residential or house robberies increased by 
25,4% in the last year from 10 173 to 12 761
incidents. These incidents have in fact been
increasing over consecutive years since they were
first indicated as a separate crime category in
2002/03. This type of crime has a very negative
impact on an individual’s feelings of safety and
general perceptions of crime. Everyone would
like to believe that their home is their sanctuary
where they and their family are safe. According
to the crime figures, the risk of having this
sanctuary invaded by criminals is on the increase.
In addition, this ‘invasion’ is often accompanied
by assault and even torture, rape and murder.
Criminals use torture as a means to achieve
compliance and to access the victim’s safe and
PIN numbers, etc.
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Figure 4: Aggravated robbery
and 10% of female victims were likely to be killed
by a friend or an acquaintance; 59% of female and
9% of male victims were likely to be killed by an
intimate partner; 17% and 18% of male and female
victims respectively were likely to be killed by a
family member; and only 2% of female victims are
killed by an unknown person, compared to 25% of
male victims.
This analysis supports the argument that the ability
of the police to impact on ‘social contact crimes’
such as murder is more limited than the public
generally realises. The only real proactive
contribution the police can make in this regard is by
creating a credible deterrent through effective and
efficient investigations (the creation of a belief or
certainty in the minds of potential criminals that
they will be caught).
Aggravated robbery
Apart from murder and rape, aggravated robbery,
certainly because of its nature and the violence or
threat of violence associated with it, currently seems
to be the most feared crime in this country. As
shown in Figure 4, aggravated robbery peaked in
2003/04 at 288 per 100 000 after consecutive
annual increases from 164 in 1996/97. In real terms
this amounts to almost 134 000 robberies compared
to ‘only’ 76 000, seven years before. In 2004/05 and
2005/06 the aggravated robbery rate (per 
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• Car hijackings have increased since 2004/05, 
from 12 434 to 13 599 incidents, an increase of
6% in 2006/07. This type of crime exacerbates
the fear experienced by most people. Fear is
becoming the common denominator in the
public perception of crime in this country. There
is a growing perception that not only are people
no longer safe in their own homes, but they face
the constant threat of being hijacked, for example
between home and workplace or during an
evening out.
• To make matters worse, business robberies 
increased with 52,2% in the last year. This is an
increase from 3 320 incidents in 2004/2005 to 
6 689 in 2006/07. This too has a negative impact
on public perceptions, for many of these crimes
happen at shopping centres and restaurants.
• In addition, bank robberies increased by 118,6% 
from 59 to 129 incidents. This crime type is again
on the increase since 2003/04, after impressive
decreases from the 561 recorded in 1996/97.
• Cash-in-transit robberies increased by 21,9% 
from 383 to 467 incidents. This crime type is also
on the increase since 2003/04, when 192
incidents were recorded.
The reason why criminals in many cases shoot and
kill their victims even after they completed the
initial crime (e.g. robbery), remains a contentious
and unresolved phenomenon. However, it is
informative to know that this phenomenon has also
been observed elsewhere. In a report by the Police
Executive Research Forum (2006:6-7) it was found,
based on the crime figures for the United States,
that not only was robbery becoming more
prevalent, but also more deadly. As one of the
police chiefs observed:
… a disturbing aspect in a number of
robberies was that upon completion of the
robbery the victim was shot anyway.
Conclusion
The main message from these figures is clear:
whatever we as a country (not just the police) are
doing to fight crime, is not working. It shows us that
there is something seriously wrong with our
approach to this ‘fight’ and the way in which we
present our crime situation. The release of this
year’s statistics was again overshadowed by
explanations of why our crime is not as bad as it
appears to be. In an apparent attempt to underplay
the gravity of the situation, the release was
accompanied by remarks such as: ‘It’s not a train
smash’ and, in reference to the possible impact of
crime on the 2010 Soccer World Cup, ‘I do not
miss any sleep over it’. 
For some reason the police allow themselves to be
blamed for the failures of government departments
across the board and for the manifestations of a
morally sick society. At the annual release of the
crime figures, the police, unfairly so, are alone in
the ‘dock’. They are expected not only to tell us
what our crime situation is, but also why it is good
or bad and what they are doing about it. Of course
the police do not help their cause by downplaying
the seriousness of the situation. However, what we
need when crime statistics are released are the
other representatives of government, such as the
Departments of Justice, Correctional Services,
Housing, Labour, Provincial and Local Government,
Welfare, to also tell us what they are doing to
address crime and the conditions conducive to
crime.
To enable a more fair and sensible distribution of
responsibility for crime fighting, we need an
integrated national strategy. Such a strategy should
direct all available government resources on a
massive scale to achieving realistic objectives. An
integrated national strategy of this kind will only be
possible if it is preceded by a comprehensive
national inquiry, e.g. by a commission of inquiry, to
determine the extent of our crime, where it
happens, why it happens, and why it is so violent.
The commission (or its alternative) should also be
mandated to determine what needs to be done, and
by whom. The allocation of tasks will have to be
realistic; both as far as the tasking of the right
people (government departments and other role
players) and the setting of achievable targets are
concerned. Such a massive and all-out national
campaign to fight crime is not only a precondition
for success, but will only work if it is controlled by
an overarching national coordinating structure with
the overriding authority to direct all government
departments, and not just the criminal justice
system. The National Security Council (NSC) may
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be just such a structure, but changes to its mandate,
structure and functioning would be required.3
Criticism about the way in which crime is being
dealt with in this country should not be construed
as if it is just another uniquely South African
phenomenon. In 1997 George Kelling and
Catherine Coles, in their book Fixing Broken
Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in
our Communities (1997:1) were highly critical of
the criminal justice approach to crime fighting in
the United States at the time:
With fear of crime at all-time high levels,
our national political leaders propose dramatic
solutions to the ‘crime problem’. They focus on
… incarceration policies, construction of more
prisons, tighter gun control, and increasing the
number of police on the streets.
Mr. Kenneth Baker, British Home Secretary in the
Thatcher government, in his memoirs in 1990,
demonstrated a similar lack of political
understanding of the complexities of crime
(Morgan & Newburn 1997:2-3): 
… while several of my ministerial
colleagues and Tory MP’s supported the
police in public, they were highly critical of
them in private. There was impatience, if
not anger, that although we had spent 87%
more in real terms since 1979, and had
increased police numbers by 27 000, there
had still been a substantial increase in
crime.
In the last six years the SAPS numbers increased
with approximately 40 000 and their budget almost
doubled from R17 billion to R32 billion. This gives
us a police/public ratio of approximately 1:370,
which is already better than the UN guideline of
1:400. This situation is set to improve even further
with more than 30 000 police officials to be added
over the next three years to reach a target of  
192 000 by 2010. We are, therefore, entitled to
expect the police and the rest of the criminal justice
system to be more effective and efficient in terms of
what they are, or should be, capable of. We know
from international research that the police do not
prevent crime; at best they can act as a deterrent to
crime in places where they (the police) are present.
This means our police need to become more
visible. A visible police presence goes a long way
to reassuring a fearful public. Police investigations
should also be motivated by the desire to engender
a realistic fear in the minds of criminals or would-
be criminals that they will be caught. For optimal
deterrence, good investigations should be followed
by well-prepared prosecutions, and a prison system
that can accommodate those who receive prison
sentences (and keep them there). Considering its
prevailing weaknesses it is clear that our criminal
justice system is currently not able to meet all of
these challenges.4
In this regard, and to the extent that the police can
reduce crime, the crime statistics do raise pertinent
questions, for example:
• What was (is) the impact of the ongoing 
restructuring process on the police’s ability to
combat crime?
• There are renewed calls for more community 
involvement in the fight against crime, but why is
it taking the police such a long time (since 1998)
to finalise (approve) its policy/national instruction
on sector policing – a practical policing concept
that was developed specifically to enhance
police-community cooperation?
• How can the police set themselves a target of 
decreasing contact crimes by 7–10% per year
when they argue, convincingly, that they do not
control the socio-economic causes and
conditions that underlie crime?
Finally, in their report on the 2006/07 crime
statistics, the police refer to the ‘mistaken’
comparison by ‘analysts’ who, for example, put
South Africa’s murder rate at approximately eight
times that of the international norm. This analyst,
for one, agrees with the police’s argument that
international comparisons, for a variety of reasons,
are highly problematic, but, like the police, we
believe that ‘very broad and rough comparison[s]’
sometimes help to determine more or less where
we stand in the international arena. Unsurprisingly,
the police themselves declare (SAPS 2007:3) that if
South Africa can reduce its contact crimes by
7–10% per year for consecutive years it will take us
at least another ten years to reach the levels of the
majority of Interpol countries. 
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Endnotes
1 All the graphs (crime rates) and the South African crime 
figures used in this article are based on information
taken from the Annual Report of the SAPS 2003/2004
(SAPS 2004:19), as well as the SAPS’s crime report for
2001/2002 to 2006/2007 (SAPS 2007:1, 7-8). The
graphs are also an updated version of those used by
Antoinette Louw (2006:2,4-5).
2 See Johan Burger 2007. A Golden Goal for South 
Africa: Security Arrangements for the 2010 FIFA Soccer
World Cup. SA Crime Quarterly (19). Pretoria: Institute
for Security Studies. pp1-6.
3 For an in-depth discussion of a national strategy to fight 
crime, see Burger, J 2007. Strategic Perspectives on
BURGER
Crime and Policing in South Africa. Pretoria: Van
Schaik Publishers.
4 See for example the discussion on some of these 
weaknesses by Altbeker, A. ‘How we got it wrong:
What to do about the failure of crime prevention’, in
this edition of the SACQ.
